Abstract. This paper describes a new practical DoS attack that can be mounted against the "encryptiononly" configuration (i.e. without authenticated integrity) of ESP as allowed by IPSec. This finding can serve as a strong argument to convince those in charge of the IPSec standardization to improve it by banning the "encryption-only" configuration from the standard.
Introduction
As illustrated in [3, 4, 6, 7, 15, 28] , it is, today, common knowledge in the cryptographic community that encryption without authenticated integrity opens the door to various attacks. More recently, the authors of [22] illustrate this argument on the encryption-only configuration allowed by IPSec for the secure payload encapsulation (ESP) [11] .
IPSec encryption-only configuration was shown to be exposed to variety of "initialization vector attacks" [15] . The authors of [15] analyze the security risks posed on encryption-only IPSec when it is used as intermediate layer of the protocol stack. But their analysis has a limited scope -just the implication on the next (possible) upper-layer protocol (e.g. TCP, UDP, IP). We develop further their idea of properly modifying certain fields in the payloads of the whole protocol stack (e.g. IP/UDP/RTP or IP/TCP). In this way we build a more powerful attack.
The authors of [22] have exposed even more serious weakness of the encryption-only configuration on IPSec. It has been shown that the "encryption-only" configuration is subject to a variety of ciphertext-only attacks, i.e. revealing the encryption key. The attack consists of two phases: in the first phase the attacker modifies certain fields in the first few blocks of the ciphertext such that the upper-layer protocol submits either an error message or the decryption of the modified datagram directly to the attacker's machine. The second phase proceeds with further recovery of the plaintext. The attacks presented in [22] are efficient and have been proven practical by the authors, i.e. against an implementation of the IPSec stack in the Linux kernel. Our attack is completely different, since it is not a chipertext-only attack, the attacker goal is to mount with minimum efforts a Denial of Service Attack (DoS) against the IPSec gateway.
One of the purposes of [22] was to help closing the gap between the currently known cryptography theory and the current practices of standard bodies, implementers and users. Among others, providing practical efficient attacks against existing (or in development) standards or products helps the various communities (theoreticians and practicians) to work together to establish cryptographically sound but workable standards and products.
The main contribution of this paper is to present yet another attack against the "encryption-only" configuration for ESP. This attack has been unearthed years ago but hasn't lead to a publication because at that time it was perceived as of no theoretical interest. However, following the example of [22] , we hope to contribute with the publication of our finding to help improving the IPSec standard (and the corresponding implementations).
Our attack is a very practical Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the IPSec gateway providers. It only requires a minimal effort from the attacker while having a devastating potential impact on the gateways performance. We think that this attack is an even stronger and convincing argument than those already published to support the banishment of the "encryption-only" configuration of ESP.
Recall that the ESP configuration is not integrity protected, thus the option provided in the ESP for replay protection makes no sense since it requires obviously data integrity. We stress that our attack is not just a reply attack since the attacker can deviate/multiply the flow to different targets. We also assume, as in [15, 22] , that the datagrams are not checked after IPSec processing to see if the correct IPSec policies were applied; this is the case in the Linux kernel implementation (as pointed out in [22] ).
Although it is commonly known that encryption without authenticated integrity is dangerous and more specifically that ESP without data authentication leads to all kind of problems there are still security IPSec specialists that claim "when IPSec gateway is protected in addition with a stateful firewall which does filter the packets, most of the described above attacks will not work." We think that such an approach is just an attempt to shift the problem, instead of eradicate it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: After an introduction to the IPSec ESP in section 2, we present the DoS attack itself in section 3.
Preliminaries

IPSec
IPSec provides security at the level of the IP layer. The secure encapsulation of the payload of IP datagrams is part of the IPSec standard and is provided by ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload, [11] ). ESP provides integrity, authentication and encryption of the IP datagrams (as an option, it is possible to add a replay protection).
The encapsulation is connectionless, i.e. it is performed on a per-datagram basis. One common use of IPSec is to build virtual private networks where IPSec is configured to use ESP in tunnel mode. The way ESP modifies the datagrams in tunnel mode is shown in Fig. 1 . ESP in transport mode provides neither authentication nor encryption for the IP header. This is a disadvantage, since false packets might be delivered for ESP processing. The advantage of transport mode is the lower processing overhead.
As in the case of AH, ESP in transport mode is used by hosts, not gateways. Gateways are not even required to support transport mode. The tunnel mode is used whenever either end of a security association is a gateway. Thus, between two firewalls the tunnel mode is always used.
ESP in Tunnel Mode
Although gateways are supposed to support tunnel mode only, often they can also work in transport mode. This mode is allowed when the gateway acts as a host, that is in cases when traffic is destined to itself. Examples are SNMP commands or ICMP echo requests.
In tunnel mode the outer headers' IP addresses does not need to be the same as the inner headers' addresses. For example two security gateways may operate an ESP tunnel which is used to secure all traffic between the networks they connect together. Hosts are not required to support tunnel mode, but often they do. IPSec supports different encryption algorithms: AES [8, 19] is the most commonly used but other block ciphers as DES [16] , 3DES [17] , CAST128 [1, 2] , RC5 [24] , IDEA [12] , and Blowfish [26] are also allowed. All block ciphers are used in CBC mode [23, 9] . Additionally, AES in CTR mode is a valid alternative [10] but in this case the standard states that "AES-CTR implementations MUST employ a non-NULL ESP authentication method, since it is trivial to forge an AES-CTR ciphertext". As a consequence, the hereafter described attack targets only the block ciphers in CBC mode. The attack depends only on the block size n of the cipher, where n = 64 for all block ciphers except for AES where n = 128, 192, 256.
TCP/ IP Tutorial and Technical Overview
CBC mode
If the to be transmitted data after ESP padding is made of q blocks, if the plaintext blocks are denoted by P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P q , and if e K (·) (d K (·)) denotes the encryption (decryption) of blocks using an n-bit key K then the CBC mode [18] works as follows. After a random n-bit IV (Initialization Vector) is generated, the ciphertext blocks are computed according to the equations:
At the receiver side the plaintext is recovered according to the equations:
As pointed out in [14, 22] a well known weakness of the CBC mode is the "bit flipping attack". An attacker can flip (invert) a specific bit in the ciphertext block C i−1 , then this specific bit in the recovered plaintext block P i is also flipped (since
. This allows an attacker to introduce controlled changes into the recovered plaintext block P i , but the previous block P i−1 is randomized. Hence the integrity of the IV in CBC should be protected otherwise uncontrolled change on the first recovered plaintext block P 1 is possible.
IP, TCP, UDP and RTP Datagrams
The hereafter presented attack depends on the way the IP stack is structured. The presentation is limited to IPv4 headers as specified in [27] . Where:
VERS
The version of the IP protocol. The current version is 4. 5 is experimental and 6 is IPv6 (see 6.2, "The IPv6 Header Format" on page 358).
HLEN
The length of the IP header counted in 32-bit quantities. This does not include the data field. The layout of the IP header is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The potential targets of the attack are the source and the destination IP addresses (32 bits each) and the header checksum (16 bits). The first 80 bits bits are disregarded and the last optional fields are assumed to be absent. Note that, in the absence of the optional fields, there is no padding.
There are two commonly used protocols in the transport layer, a connectionless one -the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [20] and a connection-oriented one -the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [21] . Thus an IP datagram may contain either UDP or TCP embedded datagrams. This gives additional targets for the attack. 
C
Bytes that can be sent without waiting for any acknowledgment.
D
Bytes that cannot yet be sent.
Remember that TCP will block bytes into segments, and a TCP segment only carries the sequence number of the first byte in the segment.
TCP Segment Format
The TCP segment format is shown in Figure 56 . Where:
Source Port
The 16-bit source port number, used by the receiver to reply.
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Fig. 3. TCP Segment Format
The TCP header [21] is illustrated in Fig. 3 . The source and the destination ports (16 bits each), the sequence and acknowledgement number (32 bits each), which together form the first 96 bits of the TCP header as well as the checksum located between 128-th and 144-th bits are additional important targets of the attack. UDP provides a mechanism for one application to send a datagram to another. The UDP layer can be regarded as being extremely thin and consequently has low overheads, but it requires the application to take responsibility for error recovery and so on.
Applications sending datagrams to a host need to identify a target that is more specific than the IP address, since datagrams are normally directed to certain processes and not to the system as a whole. UDP provides this by using ports.
The port concept is discussed in 2.6, "Ports and Sockets" on page 73.
UDP Datagram Format
Each UDP datagram is sent within a single IP datagram. Although, the IP datagram may be fragmented during transmission, the receiving IP implementation will re-assemble it before presenting it to the UDP layer. All IP implementations are required to accept datagrams of 576 bytes, which means that, allowing for maximum-size IP header of 60 bytes, a UDP datagram of 516 bytes is acceptable to all implementations. Many implementations will accept larger datagrams, but this is not guaranteed. The UDP datagram has a 16-byte header that is described in Figure 48 . The UDP header [20] is illustrated in Fig. 4 . In this case the source and destination ports as well as the checksum (16 bits each) are additional targets of the attack.
Sometimes, another protocol is encapsulated in the UDP datagrams, e.g. the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) [25] . A description of the RTP header is given in Fig. 5 , giving yet another target for the attack: the sequence number field located between 16-th and 32-th bits.
This list of protocols and targets is not exhaustive, the attack is applicable to other protocols. The rationale behind the choice of those targets is that these are the fields that are consulted or manipulated by the IP gateways in an IP network.
Without using RTP, the video and audio data, which eventually doesn't arrive at the same time at the receiving host because of delays in the network, are displayed unsynchronized. A videoconference doesn't work very well if the audio and video have different delays.
The header of an RTP packet has the following format: 
Internet Checksum
The (internet) checksum [5] is used to discover errors while datagrams are transmitted. The targets chosen in this paper to illustrate the attack: the IP header, the TCP and UDP datagrams, all use checksums to protect their content. The purpose of the internet checksum is to provide an efficient protection against transmission errors but not to provide cryptographic integrity protection of the content. The outline of the internet checksum is very simple: the data is presented as a sequence of 16 bit integers, then the 1's complement sum of these integers is computed and the checksum is the 1's complement of this sum.
The way this checksum is computed allows the fast incremental update of the checksum when the data over which it is computed is changed. For example, to update the checksum C in the IP header m to the new IP header m , but without recomputing it over the entire new IP header, the updated checksum C can be easily computed as C = C + (m − m ), as shown in [13] . Note that, to compute the new checksum, one needs to know m − m , but neither m, m nor the old checksum C are to be known.
A DoS Attack
Fields Manipulation
The choice made by some implementers or users for the "encryption-only" ESP configuration (i.e. without the "costly" authenticated integrity) is based on the false belief that confidentiality protection together with the structure of IP, TCP (or IP, UDP, RTP) datagrams is enough to detect any data change (malicious or not). This amounts at making the hypothesis that any modification to the encrypted datagrams will be detected during the parsing of the decrypted datagrams (i.e. they are supposedly malformed) or during the verification of the checksums. This is not true; an attacker can, in fact very easily, modify the encrypted (in CBC mode) datagrams in such a way that they are still acceptable for the embedded protocols such as IP, TCP, UDP, RTP. In the attack presented here, the IV is changed in such a way that the first decrypted block of plaintext P 1 is changed in a predictable way (see section 2.2). More precisely, the IV is replaced with a new one which differs only in the positions to be altered in the first block of plaintext.
Consider a confidentiality protection with a block cipher with length n = 128 (see Fig. 6 ). In this case, P 1 , the first block of data, contains the IP header checksum and the source IP address (see section 2.3). Now an attacker can change the source IP address to whatever she/he wants, then using the difference between the old and the new source IP addresses she/he can compute the new correct checksum (see section 2.4) and finally she/he can compute the new IV corresponding to the altered ESP datagram (the rest of the data remains the same). When a gateway receives such a datagram, it accepts it as a valid datagram (i.e. the IP header is valid) and forwards it further to the corresponding destination address.
In the case where n = 192 (see Fig. 7 ), the attacker has more choices. Assuming that TCP/IP (or UDP/IP) datagrams are sent, the attacker can also change the destination IP address, the source and destination ports. But since the TCP (UDP) checksum is in block P 2 , the modifications brought by the attacker must be such that the TCP (UDP) checksum does not change, i.e. it is still a valid TCP (UDP) datagram. In the case where n = 256, the attacker has even more choices (see Fig. 8 ). Assuming that TCP/IP datagrams are sent, the attacker can also change the source and destination ports from the TCP datagram as well as the sequence number and the acknowledgement number but again she/he should do that in such a way that the TCP checksum is not changed since it is still in block P 2 . If RTP/UDP/IP datagrams are sent, the attacker can change the source and destination ports from the UDP datagram without being restricted anymore to keep unchanged their UDP checksum, since the checksum is in P 1 . In addition the sequence number in the RTP datagram can also be changed.
The attack cannot be applied when n = 64 because the first 64 bits of the IP header do not contain any interesting target fields (see Fig. 9 ).
Mounting the Attack
Assume a source device communicates with a destination device through IPSec gateways A and B (see Fig. 10 ), using "encryption-only" IPSec (ESP). Consider the n = 128 case. As shown in section 3.1, an attacker can intercept a legitimate ESP datagram, modify the source address, such that the altered ESP datagram and the embedded IP header are still valid and re-inject the new ESP datagram in the network. Gateway B will accept this modified ESP datagram, extract the IP header and embedded payload (see Fig. 1 ) and forward them to the destination device. Notice that, for any legitimate ESP datagram, the attacker can 32 false source addresses and hence so many false ESP datagrams, which will have the same content as the legitimate one but will claim to come from different sources. All of them will be accepted by the gateway B and forwarded to the destination device. In this way, the gateway as well as the destination device are overloaded with junk datagrams. The attacker can mount this attack on the fly in real-time.
If we assume (as in [22] ) that the attacker knows several source IP addresses of machines which legitimately communicate through the IPSec gateway, then even stateful firewall could not defeat the attack. Moreover it is enough that the attacker knows a significant portion of this IP addresses, which might be more realistic since it may be that the host is on a network with network prefix known to the attacker, or because it is widely used address prefix.
Consider now the n = 192 and n = 256 cases. In addition to the source address, the attacker can also alter the destination address along with the source and destination ports. The rest of the attack is similar to the n = 128 case, except that the junk datagrams can be targeted to any destination address. So the attacker can mount a DoS attack on any selected server in the Internet.
Conclusions
This paper presents a very strong and practical DoS attack against the "encryption-only" configuration for ESP (IPSec). It also shows that, contrary to the intuition, increasing the cipher block size jeopardizes the security of the protocol even more, i.e. the attack becomes stronger. We sincerely hope that this attack will serve as a strong argument to improve the existing standard by banning the "encryption-only" configuration and will be a compelling example for the implementors/users of the standard convincing them not to use such a configuration.
